The state of Europe after the Eurozone crisis - a round up of developments

The longest recession in 40 years in Europe appears to have stabilised, but the search for recovery continues. Greece is taking delivery of a third bailout from the Eurozone, albeit tiny in comparison to previous loans. However, exports, consumer spending and corporate investment are still low, hinting that a recovery is still some way off. 

In the banking sector, Basel III minimum leverage ratios are being welcomed, having been recognised as a buffer against future crises. In the US, for example, minimum leverage requirements well in excess of 3% have been proposed, hinting that the Basel requirements are still seen as inadequate. It does also hint that the implementation of a globally comparable leverage ratio - as set out in Basel III - is unlikely to be met with uniform regulations around the world. 

In the EU, an agreement reached between the Member States on June 27th 2013 on a proposed directive states that in future financial crises, bank and financial institution bail-ins will be the default position, preserving depositors' money and sparing the taxpayer. Bail-outs are not ruled out, however, as the agreement gives national governments substantial flexibility to determine how best to resolve a situation. As such, governments can still determine that a taxpayer-funded bail-out is the best solution, and considering that the agreement on bail-ins is not likely to come in to force until 2018, there is still plenty of time for taxpayers to be left firmly on the hook.  Moreover, S&P considers that EU member governments with sufficient financial capacity will continue to support major creditors of systemically important banks, at least until balance sheets recover, and banks are made more resolvable through structural reforms. 

While mortgage agreements and real estate sales are increasing again in the US, the same is beginning to take place in the UK. US new home sales were up 7.9% in August, and were up 13% on the year. (Source: Census Bureau, from S&P Ratings Direct). Lower interest rates in the UK have been partly responsible for the increase in lending, along with the Bank of England "Funding for Lending" scheme which aims to target lending to the real economy, in particular SMEs. Moreover, the govenrment-backed mortgage scheme, has also aimed to boost lending to those who could otherwise not afford to get on the housing ladder, although this has been met with accusations that it will only fuel, rather than address, the housing bubble.

This all sounds remarkably positive, given the travails of the past few years. However a recent report by S&P on the state of the Eurozone is less optimistic. The report concludes that slowdowns in emerging markets, and an economic rebalancing in China, may "start to reduce the credit support provided by global diversification in recent years". The mantra that a diversified economy will weather economic storms better may prove little use should China - along with other developing economies - slow down their consumption, leaving demand stagnant throughout the global economy.

China's growth has slowed noticeably and perhaps more significantly, expectations for China's growth have also fallen. The consensus is that forecasts have fallen by one percentage point over the last year to 7.5%, however this continues to decline. This compares to a GDP of over 9% in 2010-2011, and although the Chinese leadership seems comfortable with current figures, their focus will be on balancing internal demand and consumption with international trade. 

A Eurozone slump, along with negative US fiscal policy developments, slower growth in China or a disorderly reduction in quantitative easing are currently the top risks for global credit conditions. This has had implications for European sovereign creditworthiness, along with corporate credit ratings above the sovereign. Corporate trends in Europe are still mainly negative. Fifty-six percent of S&P rating actions in the second quarter of 2013 were ratings downgrades, while over two-thirds of industry sectors carry "stable-to-negative" or "negative" outlooks. Moreover, S&P expects the Eurozone to remain in recession for the rest of 2013 and has downgraded its real GDP forecast from minus 0.5% to minus 0.8% for this quarter. The ratings agency expects a weak recovery in 2014 with a GDP of 0.8%, but expects that potential growth will remain impaired long in to the future. Furthermore, according to S&P, there is still a one in three possibility that the Eurozone could experience a sharper and deeper recession in the remainder of 2013 that could last into 2014, seeing the recovery pushed back even further into the future. Owing to the structural nature and depth of the Eurozone crisis, the agency estimates that it is unlikely for a recovery to occur earlier, or for GDP figures to improve substantially in the short to mid term. 

A recent report by Moody's affirms the provisional AA1 rating of the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) based on the contractual elements, including the "irrevocable and unconditional" guarantees by the Eurozone member states, as well as their creditworthiness and commitments to the EFSF. The strong political commitment of Eurozone member states to the Fund is also important, as Moody's assesses that any default would entail "significant pecuniary and political costs" for Europe. However, the rating is subject to a negative outlook, reflecting the negative outlooks on euro area sovereigns that are guarantors to the Fund. The three largest shareholders in the fund, Germany, the Netherlands and France, all have negative outlooks, with Finland being the only eurozone country with a stable outlook currently. 

Cyprus Downgraded

Today, Fitch Inc downgraded Cyprus to junk status - as the country officially the EU for a bail out. Cyprus had been relying on Russia for funds, but has been forced to approach Europe for €1.8billion, approximately equivalent to 10% of that country's GDP, and making it the fifth EU member state to request funds. Cyprus, which is the EU's third smallest economy, cited exposure to Greek debts, and the need to recapitalise Cyprus Popular Bank.

The bailout request comes ahead of Cyprus assuming the Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2012. It follows Spain's request for €100billion, finalised on June 9th. This will be jointly met by the EFSF and the ESM, creating a headache for lenders and future investors as only one of the funds has preferred investor status. However markets have judged neither fund as containing sufficient money to solve Eurozone woes, with blame increasingly falling at Germany's door for failure to take action.

Moody's recently downgraded Spain's sovereign debt to one notch above junk status, and has kept the rating on review for further possible downgrade, although Moody's assigns the lowest rating to that country. It's banks have so far held on to ratings at least one notch above this, due to profitable overseas businesses.

France downgraded due to "technical error"

Standard and Poor's mistakenly downgraded France yesterday due to a "technical error". This was at the expense of France, who, along with the rest of Europe, are still incandescent over the episode. It appears that a message was sent out to some subscribers stating that France's sovereign rating had been downgraded. However less than two hours later the agency withdrew the statement and reconfirm the country's AAA/A-1+ rating. The erroneous announcement caused a surge in French 10-year bond yields by up to 28 basis points, up to 3.456 per cent, although these fell again following the retraction.

Last month, Moody's stated that France was - financially speaking - the weakest economy in Europe to still cling on to its AAA credit rating, and put it on a three-month review period (see earlier post here). French bank exposure to Greek and Italian debt means that this situation has not changed.
The technical error prompted French Finance Minister Francois Baroin to ask market regulators in France and Europe to investigate the "causes and potential consequences" of Standard and Poor's actions. France's stock market regulator, AMF, subsequently opened an investigation into the incident. France's fiscal policy is premised on its AAA rating, and Nikolas Sarkozy has effectively pinned his re-election hopes on retaining the rating. A second package of austerity measures in three months was announced this week by the French prime minister, Francois Fillon.

A downgrade for France would almost certainly entail a downgrade of the EFSF, which could pose big problems for the rest of Europe. However, considering that the Fund is unlikely to be able to cover significant bail out for larger European economies a modest increase in interest rates is unlikely to derail its use for smaller loans. However, the unhappy incident does prompt questions about the internal controls and screening mechanisms in place in the big three ratings agencies, not least how it could take nearly two hours for the CRA to realize its error.

While there is no press release or statement on Standard and Poor's website regarding the mistake, reactions in Europe indicate that the matter is not likely to die down soon. Speaking today, Michael Barnier, European commissioner for the internal market stated how serious the error had been. He emphasized that it was imperative that market players exercise discipline and a special sense of responsibility. Mr. Barnier is due to unveil a new regulatory regime for credit rating agencies on Tuesday.

In other developments, the Isle of Man was downgraded one notch to AA+ from its AAA credit rating by Standard and Poor's today. The agency cited reasons that the economy was small, undiversified and focused on financial services, all of which left it vulnerable to market shocks. The agency stated that by diversifying the economy of the crown dependency, the Isle of Man could regain its AAA rating.

The Mystery of the Triple A rating and the Reincarnation of the CDO

Speaking last month, Christine Lagarde stated that if banks could raise sufficient funds on the open markets to meet their liabilities and Basel III requirements within the certified time (between 7 and 9% of capital to risk-weighted assets) then governments should step in and lend to the banks. No-one, it would seem, wants this outcome. The banks retaliated with claims that they were not in need of a second "bail out", and there aren't many taxpayers who would be happy with another round of bank bailouts.

But it's not just banks. At the end of last year, Ireland needed a bailout. Greece and Portugal swiftly followed, and now Italy and Spain have joined the list of those 'giving cause for concern'. The European Financial Stability Facility was set up following the Irish bailout as a means of dealing with the problem. At the time, no-one expected, and likely intended, for the fund to be used. It was intended merely as a 'back up' plan that would encourage the market to lend to Ireland. But this never happened, and now - unable to fulfil the government guarantees of banks - Ireland cannot raise money on the markets. Estimated interest rates of 7% on Irish government bonds being unsustainable, Ireland had to look elsewhere, and the EFSF was the remaining option.

The EFSF, it is anticipated, will borrow €750 trillion from the markets and will lend to countries in need.The means of the EFSF are combined with loans of up to € 60 billion coming from the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), i.e. funds raised by the European Commission and guaranteed by the EU budget, and up to € 250 billion from the International Monetary Fund. In other words, the fund is a special purpose vehicle (SPV) set up to lend money to countries that can't issue bonds on the markets. Investors who won't lend to Ireland and Spain because of their poor economic situations are being asked to lend to the EFSF, which will in turn lend ot Ireland and Spain. The core countries of the Eurozone have agreed to guarantee the fund, though, so each are liable for the defaults of others. Germany, France and Italy are the largest contributors, making Germany, France and Italy liable in large part for the debts of countries who borrow from that fund. So far so good.

All of the big three ratings agencies were asked to assign the fund a triple A rating - the highest possible, and each agreed. This was justified on the basis that those countries guaranteeing the loans could afford to honour their guarantees. But the fund is essentially supplying loans to people who can't borrow anywhere else because it is unlikely they'll be able to pay the loan back. It's also guaranteed by countries who aren't solvent either (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy are all guarantors too). Put this way, the triple A rating assigned seems surprisingly optimistic - reminiscent almost of the CDOs that came to symbolise the worst of the sub-prime mortgage crisis.

Of course, the CRAs have defended their actions, citing Germany's surplus and the structure of guarantees involved. Indeed, Scott Mather, Pimco fund manager, has stated that if the EFSF just loans to Ireland then the fund appears to be a fairly safe bet. The problem comes if and when more countries need to borrow from the fund. By guaranteeing Ireland's loan from the EFSF, Spain, for example, will have to set aside assets to cover the guarantee, leaving less room for manoeuvre should anything go wrong, and making it more likely to need to borrow from the fund itself. The more countries that borrow, the fewer guarantors there are, and the rating assigned will drop. In the worst case scenario, Germany, and to a lesser extent France, will be left lending to the rest of Europe, and most likely writing off a significant part of any loan. This - as we are all well aware - is well after the point at which politics steps in and marks the end of the single currency experiment - and is the worse case scenario.

It is worth noting a couple of final points. The AAA rating for the fund was necessary because the investment it is seeking to attract is mainly funds. Pension funds and other investors who usually look for low(er) risk vehicles that are investing the life savings of teachers, postal workers, etc. Ireland had its first bail out nearly one year ago. It followed IMF advice and introduced strict austerity measures. The economy has shrunk by 20%, unemployment is in the high teens and debt to GDP ratio has soared to over 100%. IMF advice hasn't solved anyone's problems, yet it is still being offered as the solution, in the form of a second bailout package. Greece is in the same situation. It is estimated that Greek debt will rise form €270 billion to €340 billion in four years time. This is predicated on the assumption that Greece follows IMF advice by introducing strict austerity measures. The problem is that Greece can't afford to service its current debt levels, let alone increased levels. Massive write offs are the only way that Greece is going to be able to default 'gently', although it does bring the wisdom and the function of the EFSF into question even further.

For more on this see NPR's Planet Money podcast on the issue. An FAQ factsheet on the EFSF is available here.