Cyprus Downgraded

Today, Fitch Inc downgraded Cyprus to junk status - as the country officially the EU for a bail out. Cyprus had been relying on Russia for funds, but has been forced to approach Europe for €1.8billion, approximately equivalent to 10% of that country's GDP, and making it the fifth EU member state to request funds. Cyprus, which is the EU's third smallest economy, cited exposure to Greek debts, and the need to recapitalise Cyprus Popular Bank.

The bailout request comes ahead of Cyprus assuming the Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2012. It follows Spain's request for €100billion, finalised on June 9th. This will be jointly met by the EFSF and the ESM, creating a headache for lenders and future investors as only one of the funds has preferred investor status. However markets have judged neither fund as containing sufficient money to solve Eurozone woes, with blame increasingly falling at Germany's door for failure to take action.

Moody's recently downgraded Spain's sovereign debt to one notch above junk status, and has kept the rating on review for further possible downgrade, although Moody's assigns the lowest rating to that country. It's banks have so far held on to ratings at least one notch above this, due to profitable overseas businesses.

S&P Revised Bank Ratings Criteria and BICRA Methodologies

Standard & Poor's has just released revised bank ratings criteria. The new criteria aims to provide greater insight into how banks are rated, and claims that the new approach is more 'intuitive'. It builds on existing methodology but aims to simplify and incorporate what has been learned over the past few years throughout the financial crisis. According to Standard & Poor's, the stresses of the crisis have forced banking to reinvent itself. There has been, and continues to be, a potential shift in the balance of power between banks in the west and those in BRICs nations, and while recovery in the former is not a foregone conclusion, neither is sustained growth in the latter. Moreover, there has also be a shift in business volumes away from the formal banking sector towards the shadow banking sector. This is somewhat due to heavier regulation of banks following the crisis and the more stringent capital and liquidity requirements. Restrictions on higher risk activities have also forced these operations elsewhere, meaning that profit margins on regulated banking activities are likely to be reduced over coming years. Moreover, government support for banks is also less certain, with moves by many governments to support certain activities, sectors, and institutions, or in some cases to make it clear to the markets that no institution is too big to fail. The new criteria are designed to reflect the changes that are taking place, and keep pace with current market practice.

The new criteria also aim to establish a greater degree of global consistency across the ratings frameworks and - interestingly - in so doing to sustain market confidence in the ratings.

The revised BICRA (Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment and Assumptions) methodology results from consultations carried out throughout 2010 following a request for comment back in January 2010. According to the feedback from this request, Standard & Poor's report that one of the most often cited complaints was a lack of clarity about the criteria and how it was applied. Consequently, Standard & Poor's appears to be on something akin to a PR drive at the moment to publicize and more importantly explain how the methodology works.

So what is new?

The criteria take a revised approach to investment banking, with elements allowing for a greater differentiation of risk. This can now be taken into account with the business profile. Credit risks of banks operating in different business lines are also more clearly differentiated, meaning that risks pertaining to a specific sector can be more accurately expressed.

Secondly, criticism was levelled in replies to the 2010 request for comments that no account was taken of stronger liquidity of institutions in funding analysis. Under the revised criteria, "funding and liquidity" is a discreet factor. Now, when this is above average (strong liquidity and above-average funding), the standalone credit profile can be raised by one notch.

Thirdly, criticism was also directed at the practice of using capital standards globally. Under this system, the RAC (risk adjusted capital) ratio of banks operating in higher risk countries would be assessed in the same way as banks operating in lower risk countries. However, the capital standards one would expect to be achieved by a bank operating in a high risk country would, on average, be less. Under the revised criteria, country profiles are taken into account, and therefore for a bank operating in a higher risk country with a standalone credit risk anchor of BB or B-, slightly lower RAC ratios (moderate amounts of capital) falling just short of the usual 5-7% will not automatically see a rating reduced by one notch, as was previously the case. Risk adjusted capital frameworks (bank capital methodology) remain unchanged.

Finally, the BICRA methodology, while retaining its original structure, has been tightened somewhat. The criteria has been integrated more sovereign analysis in an attempt to make ratings more consistent. The BICRA methodology itself is designed to allow for evaluations and comparisons between global banking systems, with the system being given a BICRA score between 1 and 10, with 1 comprising the lowest risk groups and 10 the highest. A BICRA analysis for a country includes both rated and unrated financial institutions that take deposits and/or extend credit within a particular country. The new methodology takes a macroeconomic approach, looking at the entire financial system of a country and considering the relationship between the banking system and financial system as a whole, including the impact of non-bank market participants. The macroeconomic approach also assesses the influence of government supervision and regulation of the banking sector, including emergency support mechanisms, although note that targeted government intervention for systemically significant institutions is reflected through ratings uplift rather than BICRA.
The methodology remains divided into the two main areas of economic risk and industry risk, which are each further subdivided into three. Standard & Poor's claim that this will not only make the analysis easier for the user to assess, but will make bank ratings more consistent with their sovereign counterparts. Each factor is assessed for an economic and industrial score for each country - the BICRA score. The rating methodology for banks uses the economic and industrial profiles produced by the BICRA analysis to give an anchor which then acts as the starting point for determining the bank's stand alone credit profile (SACP). Following this, factors such as support from a government or parent group are considered before an overall rating is assigned.

The guidance notes go on to state that the creditworthiness of a sovereign and its banking sector are closely related, and that many of the factors underlying a sovereign rating are relevant in determining a BICRA score. Also, the sovereign rating methodology is applied in assessing sub-factor such as "economic resilience" and "economic imbalances". The methodology also recognizes that the influence of a sovereign's creditworthiness on the related BICRA is more pronounced when the sovereign's creditworthiness deteriorates.

In a paper written last year I suggested that greater amounts of end-user due diligence could be encouraged to relieve some of the excess reliance on market 'opinions' produced by credit rating agencies. The revision of analyses to enable users of ratings to more readily understand the methodology certainly goes some way towards increasing the transparency of the methods used and analysis undertaken by the agency and should be applauded. However we should be careful. The methodology is certainly more accessible, and Standard & Poor's are clearly aware that greater transparency of process is necessary for market trust and maintaining reputational capital. But we are still none the wiser as to the quality of information that goes in to the algorithms, or indeed what institutional and economic assumptions these latter are based on.

The new criteria are due to be applied in November/December 2011, and Standard & Poor's claims that the impact of the new methodologies will be less than previously feared, with 90% of new rating anticipated to remain within one notch of their previous rating. The agency claims that around 10% of A1 ratings will fall to A2 as a result of the revisions.

All criteria documents can be accessed online, and each has a straightforward explanation of the function and purpose of the criteria.

... and the downgrades continue

And so the banking crises and the sovereign debt crises rumble on, with endless meetings in Brussels that have so far achieved stupendously little given the time already devoted. We are being reassured that progress is taking place, so perhaps just a little longer...

In the meantime several more European downgrades have been occupying the rating agencies. On the 18th October Moody's cut Spain's sovereign credit rating, making it the last of the big three rating agencies to take such action, lowering the rating from Aa2 to A1. A couple of weeks before, Fitch had cut Spain's sovereign rating to A minus from double A, followed closely by a similar move by Standard and Poor's. Considering Spain's sovereign rating was triple A status until September last year, recent downgrades mark the latest turn in a significant drop. Moody's cited reasons of political uncertainty (further elections could see the conservative People's Party make huge gains in elections on November 20th), unrealistic deficit reduction plans (from 9.2 per cent of GDP last year to 4.4 per cent in 2012) with equally unrealistic growth figures (forecasts of 1.8 per cent growth have been estimated by Moody's to be closer to 1 per cent). Further reasons cited include the government debts of Spain's 17 autonomous regions, and the willingness of these to curb their spending.

Moody's have also downgraded both Belgium and Italy, the latter following a similar move by Standard and Poor's last month. Standard and Poor's have also downgraded three large Italian banks although it confirmed the ratings of 18 large banks - including the largest by assets. 21 regional banks were also downgraded. However concerns have been raised by the head of Italy's banking association and chairman of Monte dei Paschi, Giuseppe Mussari, that EU bank recapitalisation plans being discussed in Brussels could do more harm than good in Italy by forcing banks to hold 'unnecessary' amounts of capital and exacerbating the sovereign debt crisis. Italy's 10-year bond yield rose 7 basis points to 5.867 per cent on Tuesday, the highest close since before the European Central Bank began buying Italian bonds on August 8 to try keep down borrowing costs.

As negotiations to bail out Greece and the Euro with it continue in Brussels, Moody's has announced that it may change the outlook on France's triple A rating from stable to negative in the next three months. As is customary in such situations, a downgrade is neither forthcoming or imminent, but the mere prospect of such sends shivers through the markets and French banks' shares fell following the announcement. Moody's praised France's 'very high economic strength', its 'ample capacity to absorb shocks' and its 'favourable public debt maturity', along with political efforts aimed at fiscal consolidation. However, the global financial and economic crisis had, according to the rating agency, led to a deterioration in French 'government debt metrics'.

The agency stated that France's finances were now among the weakest of those countries which still had a triple A rating. France's public finances are not only looking vulnerable but French banks are heavily indebted to Greece. Standard and Poor's last week downgraded BNP Paribas by one notch from double A to double A minus citing exposure to Greek debt. What's more, major consequences could follow for France if Greece defaults on its liabilities and markets react poorly, or if there are any further defaults. Add in the fact that France has been gradually becoming less competitive for businesses over the past years - in contrast to neighbouring Germany - and it becomes easy to understand why Sarkozy might be worried. Moody's isn't alone, however, as Standard and Poor's included France in the role call of countries likely to see further downgrades in the case of a double dip recession - alongside Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal. France's public debt is approaching 90 per cent of GDP and so a downgrade could prove extremely painful, even though this figure is set to fall as France's budgetary deficit is brought down from 5.7% currently to 3% in 2013. These figures are - as most Eurozone projections - based on optimistic growth forecasts. France anticipates 1.75% over the next year. Most commentators doubt this will materialize, either making deficit reduction a longer-term goal, or necessitating further austerity measures in the run up to the election next year.

France is already committed to €158.5bn ($217bn) in guarantees for the new eurozone rescue fund, the European financial stability facility, which is equivalent to 8.5 per cent of GDP. It has also just agreed to guarantees for the failing Franco-Belgian bank Dexia. Now these don't matter much unless and until one of these fails, at which point the government is bound to step in. But it does mean that France has much less room for manoeuvre on its balance sheets than it did three years ago, leaving it vulnerable to further financial shocks. It is also limited in the resources it can supply to the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), and Germany's peas for a greater Greek write-off followed by French re-leveraging of banks is, as a consequence, increasingly difficult. Politically, at least, Sarkozy has hailed the AAA rating as 'untouchable', and while rating agencies take political direction into account, it will no doubt take more than a statement of intent to preserve France's rating.

UK financial firms downgraded by Moody's

The credit rating agency Moody's has downgraded the senior debt and deposit ratings of twelve UK financial firms, including RBS (down two notches from AA3 to A2), Lloyds TSB (down one notch from AA3 to A1), Nationwide and Santander UK. Nine Portuguese banks were also subjected to the same. While the agency stated that it did not believe that conditions had deteriorated, it attributed the downgrades to the belief that the UK government was less likely to bail out any of the institutions should they get into difficulties.
The removal of implicit government support for the banking sector was welcomed by Lloyds as necessary for the sector in the UK at least to stand on its own once again, however the news prompted falls in all the share prices, including for Barclays whose share price fell in accordance with the other banks despite the fact that it was not downgraded.

The Chancellor George Osborne stated that British banks were among some of the best capitalized in the world, and that the government were taking steps to address the "too big to fail" problem. Of course, detail is scant, and heralding capitalization levels and stress test successes should be taken, one feels, with a Dexia-sized pinch of salt. Moody's split the downgrades into three categories - those institutions still with a high likelihood of government support, a moderate level, and a low level of support. Unsurprisingly, the large banks including RBS and Lloyds fell into the first category, while the smaller institutions were split between the second and third.

While most UK banks have exposure to Irish sovereign debt, they are not exposed to other Eurozone countries in the same way as some of the European banks. There's more on this point, along with discussion of some interesting calculations carried out by French bank Natixis here.

Moody's downgrade Italian bonds

Moody's, the credit rating agency, has been busy. The agency cut Italy's government bond ratings yesterday, this time by three notches to A2. Reasons cited include long-term funding risks for states in the Eurozone and high levels of public debt. While this is the first downgrade of Italian bonds for many years, the move parallels recent activity by Standard and Poor's who recently downgraded Italian sovereign debt to single A. The ratings from the two CRAs now equate with each other, and both have a negative outlook, meaning that further downgrades could follow. While the downgrade from Standard and Poor's comprised a thinly veiled warning about the political leadership of the country, that of Moody's appears to focus less heavily on the antics of Berlusconi and more on the Eurozone banking and sovereign crises.
Many large French and German banks are heavily exposed to Italy, and the downward revision of that country's sovereign debt will only fuel fears that the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is morphing into a second banking crisis.
Also on Tuesday, Moody's placed the ratings of seven Hungarian banks (OTP Bank NyRt, OTP Mortgage Bank, K&H Bank, Budapest Bank, FHB Mortgage Bank, Erste Bank Hungary and MKB Bank) on review for possible downgrade. The move follows the approval of a law in that country that would allow foreign currency mortgage borrowers to repay their loans in full at exchange rates falling well short of current market rates. Moody's cites that this will add potential stress to a banking system "already under significant pressure". Around 80% of Hungarian banks are owned by foreign banks.

This morning, Moody's has also placed on review for downgrade the standalone bank financial strength ratings (BFSRs), the long-term deposit and senior debt ratings and the short-term ratings of Dexia Group. The liquidity position of the Group, along with wider concerns about the state of the market is cited as reasons. Further details are available here.